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Environmental Law: Are Oklahoma Environmental
Permits Valid Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause? DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Department
of Health
L Introduction
(T)he granting of the permit itself does not interfere with the use and
enjoyment of... property in a constitutional sense .... For us to
conclude otherwise we would have to rule, as a matter of law, all
landfills are nuisances and the State by permitting them in an effort to
protect the public health and environment must itself pay compensation
to individuals who at some subsequent time in the future may be injured
by the operation.'
Although once considering it untenable,2 in DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dept. of
Health,3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently embraced the above position. In fact,
the DuLaney court declared that "notice and an opportunity for a hearing must be
afforded to citizenry whose health, property use, and drinking water may be affected
by the location of a landfill site."4 This undefined statement constitutes the significance of DuLaney. The Oklahoma Supreme Court not only fails to limit the infinite
realm of potentially affected parties, but it also applies this statement retroactively,
creating a cloud of uncertainty as to the validity of all environmental permits.
In light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's ideological shift in DuLaney, this note
will examine the legality of the environmental permitting process in Oklahoma. This
evaluation will begin with an historical overview of Oklahoma environmental permits,
then proceed to the current state of the law under DuLaney. Finally, this note will
explore DuLaney's impact on Oklahoma environmental permits.
II. History
In the past two decades, society's concern for ecological decay has increased
dramatically.5 In the wake of this heightened awareness, both Congress and state

1. Stewart v. Rood, 796 P.2d 321, 336 (Okla. 1990).
2. Actually, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered this position to be untenable in 1990, only
three years prior to the DuLaney ruling.
3. 868 P.2d 676 (Okla. 1993).
4. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
5. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1970-1990: TWENTIETH
ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1990).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:651

legislatures have struggled with the issue of environmental pollution and enacted a
complex structure of environmental regulations and controls!
The Oklahoma legislature responded to environmental pollution by enacting the
Oklahoma Environmental Quality Acte and the Oklahoma Environmental Quality
Code.9 Under these statutes, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) is the
official state agency that is to cooperate with federal agencies in the areas of point
source pollution, water quality, air quality under the Clean Air Act, Superfund
responsibilities under CERCLA," solid waste, and hazardous waste. 2 The DEQ
established various divisions to perform these statutory responsibilities. The Office of
Business Assistance, for instance, is responsible for assisting business in understanding
the process for the issuance of permits and licenses necessary to comply with the
Oklahoma Environmertal Quality Code. 3 The permitting process is one of the DEQ's
primary responsibilitie.3.
Environmental litigation generally involves a review of administrative decisions
because causes of action are routinely based on the issuance or denial of permits.
Prior to DuLaney, however, every Oklahoma court hearing a challenge to the issuance
of a permit had dismissed the environmental permitting agency from the litigation. 4
A private party pursuing a claim against an administrative agency must overcome
three judicial obstacles: (1) the doctrine of standing, (2) judicial review of
discretionary agency .ction, and (3) the legislature's ability to exercise valid police
power. The doctrine of standing requires that the litigant is the real party in interest. 5
The real party in interest is defined as the party legally entitled to the proceeds or the
control of the claim, the party who by substantive law has the right of action. 6
The standing doctrine requires that courts not rule on hypothetical situations. 7 A
party must have a "p zrsonal stake" in the outcome of the litigation because of an
actual or threatened distinct injury which has a causal connection with the alleged
wrong and the challenged actions. 8 While this distinct injury requirement may

6. See Vicki A. O'Meara, State-FederalRelations in EnvironmentalLaw, C795 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 629,
634 (1993).
7. After legislatures promulgate these rules and delegate authority to administrative agencies, these
agencies maintain the principle responsibility to implement environmental programs.
8. 27A OKLA. STAT, §§ 1-1-101 to 1-3-103 (Supp. 1994).
9. Id. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-14-304.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
11. Id. §§ 9601-9673
12. All of the responsibilities of the DEQ are illustrated in 27A OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-3-101(B), 2-3101(B) (Supp. 1994).
13. Id. § 2-3-101(F)(2).
14. Brief in Chief for Appellant at 8, DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dept. of Health, 868 P.2d 676
(Okla. 1993) (Nos. 70498. 70524).
15. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2017 (Supp. 1994).
16. Mainord v. Sharp, 569 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1977); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Associates Trans.,
512 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1973).
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
18. Turley v. Flag-Redfem Oil Co., 782 P.2d 130, 135 (Okla. 1989) (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976); Seal v. Corporation Comm'n 725 P.2d 278, 283 (Okla.
1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987)).
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include such things as aesthetic, conservational, or recreational injuries, the litigant
must have suffered a cognizable injury to have standing. 9
Standing to appeal an administrative agency's decision involves a separate set of
requirements. Generally, a party must be aggrieved. An administrative decision must
have a substantial, adverse effect that is direct and immediate rather than contingent
on some remote or possible consequence.'
In a case similar to DuLaney, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals advocated
a three-prong test to determine whether a party can compel the review of an
administrative agency's decision. A petitioner must allege that: (1) the challenged
action caused an injury in fact, (2) the interest sought to be protected is within the
zone of interests protected by the statute in question, and (3) no clear legislative intent
to withhold judicial review exists.!2'
In addition, the separation of powers has deterred courts from reviewing
statutorily authorized action. The judiciary does not have the power to act as "a superlegislature by re-writing legislative enactments to conform with its views of public
policy." There is a strong presumption favoring legislative acts. A statute will be
upheld unless it is clearly inconsistent with established law.24
Courts are also reluctant to review administrative agency rulings with pronounced
scrutiny. The deference a court will give an agency decision depends upon the role
of the agency in the challenged action. Administrative agencies have two primary
functions: (1) rule-making or legislative and (2) adjudicative.' Generally, courts
attach great weight to the expertise of an administrative agency in its legislative
functions and presume their validity.' Courts do not substitute their own judgment
for that of the administrative agency, particularly if the question falls within the
agency's expertise
Adjudicatory actions of an agency, however, receive less
deference.
The proper exercise of state police power may curtail an individual's claimed due
process rights. Certainly, some discretionary government functions are not subject to
the Due Process Clause Under a state's police power, a legislature may regulate the
19. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
20. Turley, 782 P.2d at 135 (citing Shop & Swap Advertiser, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 774
P.2d 1058, 1060 (Okla. 1989); Whitman v. Whitman 397 P.2d 664, 667 (Okla. 1964); Love v. Wilson,
75 P.2d 876, 878 (Okla. 1938)).
21. DuPont Circle Citizens Ass'n v. Barry, 455 A.2d 417, 421 (D.C. 1983).
22. The separation of powers doctrine dictates that each government branch - the legislative,
executive, and judicial - should remain independent, separate, and distinct. State ex rel. York v. Turpen,
681 P.2d 763, 767 (Okla. 1984).
23. Stewart v. Rood, 796 P.2d 321, 329 (Okla. 1990) (citing Toxic Waste Impact Group v. Leavitt,
755 P.2d 626, 630 (Okla. 1988)).
24. Turley, 782 P.2d at 137 (citing Black v. Ball Janitorial Serv., 730 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1986);
Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 679 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Okla. 1984); Kimery v. Pubic Serv.
Co., 622 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Okla. 1981)).
25. Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1986).
26. Toxic Waste Impact Group v. Leavitt, 755 P.2d 626, 630 (Okla. 1988).
27. Id. (citing Tulsa Area Hosp. Council v. Oral Roberts Univ., 626 P.2d 316, 320 (Okla. 1981)).
28. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-17 (1971).
29. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976). While the claimed discretionary function
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use of a private individual's property to protect the public interests of health, safety,
and welfare?' In fact, the exercise of state police power in a lawful manner is due
process of law.3'
In Oklahoma, the DEQ exercises police power under the Oklahoma Solid Waste
Management Act (CISWMA)? 2 The OSWMA serves to regulate the collection,
transportation, processing, and disposal of solid waste. The OSWMA's objective is to
protect public health, safety, and welfare, protect the environment, conserve natural
resources, enhance the beauty and quality of the environment, and encourage the
recycling of solid waste.33
Protecting the status of the environment in the interest of public health and safety
are valid motivations for the proper exercise of state police power.' In this sense,
the rights of the individual will be balanced with the general welfare of the public.
Generally, "a valid exercise of the police power... which limits or infringes upon
private rights does not, ipso facto, violate the due process clauses of the state or
Federal constitutions. '
Recently, public awareness and concern for environmental health and safety have
dramatically increased3 Legislative bodies have attempted to be responsive to and
remain in touch with societal sentiment. Initially, legislative response to ecological
pollution received much deference. Recent judicial scrutiny has increased the complex
nature of environmental laws - laws that may sacrifice individual rights for
widespread public benefit. Against this backdrop, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
decided DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Department of Health?7
111. DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Departmentof Health
A. Facts
The Oklahoma Department of Health (the Department) issued a landfill permit to
Six-Hart Services and Resources, Inc. (Six-Hart) after denying the mineral interest
owners and adjacent landowners an evidentiary hearing.3' Pursuant to the Oklahoma
Administrative Procedures Act (OAPA),3" the mineral interest owners and adjacent

pertained to the daily operations of state prisons as revised by federal courts, the Court did acknowledge
the existence of constitutional rights still maintained by convicted felons. Id. at 225.
30. Glaser v. Tulsa Metro. Area Planning Comm'n, 360 P.2d 247, 251 (Okla. 1961) (citing
Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 35 P.2d 435, 436 (Okla. 1934)).
31. State ex rel. Oklchoma Corp. Comm'n v. Texas County Irrigation & Water Resource Ass'n, 818
P.2d 449, 453 (Okla. 1991) (citing Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 241 P.2d 363
(Okla. 1951) (quoting Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1934))).
32. 27A OKLA. STAr. §§ 2-10-101 to 2-10-1111 (Supp. 1994).
33. Id. § 2-10-102.
34. Cryan v. State, 583 P.2d 1122, 1124-25 (Okla. 1978).
35. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Choctaw Gas Co., 236 P.2d 970, 976 (Okla. 1951).
36. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
37. 868 P.2d 676 (Okla. 1993).

38. Id. at 679.
39. 75 OKLA. STAT § 306 (1991) (stating that the validity or applicability of a rule may be
challenged by declaratory judgment in a district court if the threatened application interferes with or
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landowners filed a declaratory judgment action in district court against the Department
and Six-Hart.' They challenged the OSWMA4' for its failure to include "trial-type"
proceedings in the issuance of a landfill permit.4 The trial court found the permit
process invalid for the failure to notify the proper parties and conduct an individual,
"trial-type" proceeding.43
B. Issue
When an applicant seeks a permit, under Oklahoma law, to operate a solid waste
disposal site, are adjacent landowners and mineral interest owners entitled to notice
and the opportunity to be heard?45
C. Holding
1. Who Is Entitled to Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard?
Prior to DuLaney, claims that the issuance of environmental permits denies a party
due process protection were unsuccessful in Oklahoma. The Due Process Clause in
the Oklahoma Constitution is consistent with the United States Constitution.'
To establish a procedural due process violation, a party must allege two elements:
(1) the deprivation of a constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest48
and (2) the lack of procedural safeguards to adequately protect the deprived interest.4 9
Property interests are not constitutionally created but are created and defined by state
statutes and rules. 5' A person must have a legitimate and immediate claim or
entitlement which cannot be arbitrarily denied to have a protected property interest. 5'
Due process protects against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government
action. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are the essential elements of due
process.'
In DuLaney, the Oklahoma Supreme Court faced due process claims instituted by
adjacent landowners and mineral interest owners. The right to enter land for oil and
gas exploration is a constitutionally protected property right for the purposes of the
Due Process Clause.'
Because mineral interest owners clearly possess a
impairs
40.
41.
42.

the legal right or privileges of the plaintiff).
DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 679.
63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2251-2265 (1981).
DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 679.

43. Id.
44. The relevant statute was located at 63 OKLA. STAT. § 2258.2 (Supp. 1983) when the cause of
action accrued, 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-2415 (1991) when the case reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
and is currently found at 27A OKLA. STAT. § 2-10-303 (Supp. 1994).
45. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 677-78.
46. OKLA. CONsT. art. II, § 7.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
49. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
50. Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Okla. 1980).
51. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
52. Id. at 589.
53. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Morrow, 877 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Okla. 1994).
54. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 680 (citing Anschutz Corp. v. Sanders, 734 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Okla. 1987);
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constitutionally protected property right, this note will concentrate on the rights of the
undefined adjacent landowners.
As noted above, the DuLaney court stated that "notice and an opportunity for a
hearing must be afforded to citizenry whose health, property use, and drinking water
may be affected by the location of a landfill site.' 55 Within these broad and undefined
terms, the Oklahoma Supreme Court included adjacent landowners, whose "concerns
include the potential for harmful contaminates in both the air and ground water
underlying their property."'
Initially, the court revisited the precedent rulings on the issue of adjacent
landowners' rights to notice and the opportunity to be heard in the permitting process.
This examination involved two recent cases, Stewart v. Rood 7 and Sharp v. 251st
Street Landfill.58 Because, as it claimed, Sharp relied upon Stewart, the court focused
its attack on Stewart.59
In Stewart, the Oklahoma Supreme Court faced the issues of whether adjacent
landowners have a protected property interest, and whether the mere granting of a
landfill permit constitutes a governmental taking. These issues were matters of first
impression.
The Stewart court questioned the claimants' standing. To contest an administrative
decision, a party must be adversely affected by an agency's decision in a manner that
is direct and immediate, rather than based upon a remote possibility.6' In a holding
that DuLaney would later sharply contradict, the Stewart court held that: "The mere
granting of a permit itself for one individual to use their land for a landfill does not
invade a legally recognized interest of adjoining landowners."'62 It does not interfere
with the use and enjoyment of the property in a constitutional sense.' In fact, the
adverse effects claim was based upon remote occurrence.' Consequently, without the
deprivation of a protected property right, courts need not consider the reasonableness
of the particular process afforded the claimant.
In Stewart, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on Fusco v. State of Connecticut'
and BAM Historic DistrictAss'n v. Koch"5 for additional support of its rejection of

Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 698-99 (Okla. 1979)).
55. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 683 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 682.

57. 796 P.2d 321 (Okla. 1990).
58. 810 P.2d 1270 (O11a. 1991).
59. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682.
60. Stewart, 796 P.2d at 326.
61. Id. at 333 (citing Hirst Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Say. & Loan Bd., 569 P.2d 993, 996 (Okla.
1977)). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
62. Stewart, 796 P.2d at 334. The DuLaney dissent properly illustrates the limitless ramifications
if due process rights are implicated when a governmental agency issues a permit to a private party. Must
an individual, trial-type proieeding challenge the issuance of even a driver's license? See infra note 161
and accompanying text.
63. Stewart, 796 P.2d at 336.
64. Id. at 334.
65. 815 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987).
66. 723 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the adjacent landowners' due process claim6 In Fusco and BAM, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the mere diminution in property
values as a result of state action does not deprive a person of property within the
context of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly
accepted this finding and decreed: "[Tio rule otherwise would set a dangerous
precedent and would be an unwarranted expansion of recognized due process
concepts."' Therefore, a cognizable loss of property must exist before such an
interest demands due process protection.
Finally, the Stewart court evaluated the issue of governmental taking based on the
issuance of the landfill permit. The court held that the mere granting of a permit for
the operation of a sanitary landfill to a neighbor does not constitute a taking." Again,
the Stewart court did not find a deprived property interest. Instead, the court found
the permitting procedure to be a valid exercise of police power to protect the public
health and the environment.!7'
In overruling Stewart and, therefore, Sharp, the DuLaney court set forth two
arguments. First, the court contended that the Oklahoma legislature had overruled
these two cases by amending the statutory right to notice.' While the legislature had
amended the statutory right to notice, the effective date of the revised statute had been
strictly limited?3 Under section 2-10-303(C) of the OSWMA, the administrative
procedural changes should not be applied to any landfill permits issued prior to the
statutory effective date. Therefore, Stewart and Sharp would still apply to the
DuLaney claimants' due process rights.
In its second contention, the DuLaney court sought to distinguish the DuLaney facts
from those in the three cases relied upon in Stewart.74 The DuLaney court pointed
out that none of these cases involved the operation of a sanitary landfill adjacent to
residences." The DuLaney court attempted to distinguish the remedial difficulty of
its alleged harm from the temporariness and correctability of the harm in Stewart.76
If the remediation of the harm is the central distinction, then the DuLaney court should
have considered the presence of alternative common law remedies.'
The DuLaney court also focused on the nature of the claimed injuries." These
injuries were contamination of air and groundwater underlying the property, odor,

67. Stewart, 796 P.2d at 334.
68. Fusco, 815 F.2d at 206; BAM, 723 F.2d at 237.
69. Stewart, 796 P.2d at 334.
70. Id. at 336.
71. Id.
72. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682.
73. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
74. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682. The three cases in question were Fusco v. Connecticut, 815 F.2d
201, 206 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); BAM Historic Dist. Ass'n v. Koch, 723 F.2d
233 (2d Cir. 1983); and Mehta v. Surles, 720 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
75. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682.
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 120, 121 and accompanying text.
78. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682.
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safety hazards, and property devaluation.? The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however,
has already established that property devaluation does not constitute a deprivation
under the Fourteenth Amendment." In addition, though offering several injuries to
distinguish DuLaney from the Stewart authority, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied
on claimed groundwater contamination as the sole property interest demanding
Fourteenth Amendment protection."1 Even if the nature of the injuries may differ, this
does not require the conclusion that the principles cannot be consistently applied to
each fact pattern as suggested by the DuLaney court.
The DuLaney court cited Brown's Ferry Waste Disposal Center, Inc. v. Trent' to
support its shift in pcsition." In Brown's Ferry, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that unless affected persons are given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
the issuance of a solid waste disposal contract, the contract is void.' The Alabama
Supreme Court determined that the demands of constitutional due process require such
a holding.' The Brown's Ferry court defined affected persons as those within the
county in which the facility would operate.'
The dicta in DuLaney, however, is more vague: "[N]otice and an opportunity for
a hearing must be afforded to citizenry whose health, property use, and drinking water
may be affected by the location of the landfill site."n The Oklahoma Supreme Court
failed to define the phrase "citizenry [who] ...may be affected." It is unclear
whether the permitting agency must provide notice and the opportunity to be heard to
citizens in the same county, state, region, or even country. Due to the ambient nature
of air, for example, the air quality of citizenry in downwind states certainly may be
affected. Must all persons who possibly may be affected receive notice and the
opportunity for a hearing, especially in an individual, trial-type proceeding, to contest
the issuance of each and every Oklahoma environmental permit?
Without solving t.ais dilemma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court evaluated the
sufficiency of the property interest alleged in DuLaney. First, the court referred to the
expansive nature of a such an interest." In fact, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that aesthetic and environmental well being are important components of
the quality of life.' While property interests can be liberally established, the
DuLaney court decision would create uncertainty in the law. Under the DuLaney
analysis, any conceivable adverse environmental effect would implicate constitutional
due process claims. Therefore, the validity of all previously issued environmental
permits would be jeopardized.

79. Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See supra notes (8, 69 and accompanying text.
DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 684. See infra notes 94, 95 and accompanying text.
611 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 1992).
DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682.
Brown's Ferry, 611 So. 2d at 230.

85. Id.

86. Id. at 228.
87. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 683 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
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This improperly applies the Due Process Clause. There are limitations to protected
property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, these rights are established
by local statutes. 9 If no statutory right to property exists, no due process claim can
survive. Second, there must be a deprivation.9 Without the deprivation of a statutory
property right, the establishment of that right is irrelevant.'
The DuLaney majority eventually emphasized groundwater rights as the remaining
source worthy of constitutional protection. "Water rights are property which are an
important part of the landowners' bundle of sticks.' 93 Certainly, the landowner owns
water flowing under the land.' The Oklahoma Supreme Court stumbled upon a
statutory property right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The DuLaney court should have evaluated the evidence to determine whether the
operation of the solid waste landfill would threaten the adjacent landowners'
groundwater. Instead, the court expressed that the adjacent mineral interest owners'
5
drilling operations "could potentially contaminate the groundwater supply."' The
court reasoned that since the mineral interest owners are being constitutionally
protected, so too should the adjacent landowners." The court, in the process, failed
to offer persuasive legal analysis.
Unfortunately, the DuLaney decision does not clarify the entitlement of notice and
the opportunity to be heard. In effect, it disregards the need for a claimant to have a
deprived, protected property right 7 Consequently, the DuLaney decision confuses
the issue.
2. What Type of HearingIs Mandated?
The DuLaney court also poorly decided the issue of determining the correct due
process procedure. The essential elements of due process require notice and the

90. Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Okla. 1980).
91. Id.

92. At the administrative level the validity of a deprivation claim is certainly suspect. At the
issuance of the permit, landowners adjacent to the proposed landfill site have not been deprived of
anything, much less a constitutionally protected property right. After the operation of the landfill
commences, on the other hand, the adjacent landowner may experience property interference. Not until
that point, however, can a deprivation surface. To appeal an administrative agency's decision, a party
must have an immediate adverse effect rather than contingent on a possible consequence. See supra note
20 and accompanying text.
93. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 684 (quoting 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (1991)).

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Recently, the West Virginia Solid Waste Management Act was declared unconstitutional. The
Act allowed the denial of a permit based solely on the presence of "adverse public sentiment." Steven
B. Barrett, EnvironmentalLaw - West Virginia'sAmended Solid Waste Management Act Circumvents
Substantive Due Process Claims Under the FourteenthAmendment - Geo-Tech Reclamation Industries,

Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989), 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 79 (1992) (quoting W.
VA. CODE § 20-5f-4(b) (1983)). The DuLaney decision approaches a similar state of blind denial.
Undoubtedly, majoritarian opposition to constructing nearby sanitary landfills will always exist.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:651

opportunity to resp)nd.1' Under the OSWMA, the statutory notice requirement
merely directed that the applicant "give notice by one publication in two newspapers
local to the proposed disposal site of opportunity to oppose the granting of such permit
by requesting a formal public meeting."'
The DuLaney court did not perceive the "formal public meeting" to be a sufficient
opportunity to respond. Instead, the court announced that the OAPA"m provides for
an individual proceAding.'' In effect, the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed the
OAPA's apparent requirement of a quasi-judicial, "trial-type" proceeding to preempt
the formal public meeting standard as provided in the OSWMA.
Other commentators, however, do not hold the same convictions. For instance, one
commentator explained: "The Administrative Procedures Act only regulates the
exercise of power already vested in an agency. To determine what power or authority
a particular agency raight have, a person must examine the statute.., which created
the agency."'" Once. an administrative agency is vested with statutory authority to
perform specific functions, the operation of these functions does not require
consistency with the Administrative Procedures Act.
In addition, the Administrative Procedures Act does not dictate the utilization of an
individual trial-type proceeding in all licensing procedures, but only when the
permitting decision is required to be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be
heard." Without some underlying basis for a quasi-judicial proceeding, the
Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act itself does not require one.
The Stewart court properly held that no mandate exists in the OAPA for an
individual trial-type proceeding prior to the issuance of a landfill permit. First, while
such a permit would fall under the definition of a license under the OAPA,a a
quasi-judicial proceeding does not have to precede the issuance of every license."0
Such proceedings are only required when an underlying basis in the law demands
notice and the opportunity to be heard."0 The underlying basis may be another state
statute, the Oklahoma Constitution, or the United States Constitution.'"
The Stewart court further determined that the legislature did not intend the granted
"formal public meeting"'" to mean a quasi-judicial proceeding as requested by the
adjacent landowners."0 Clearly, the court reasoned, if the legislature sought to give

98. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
99. 63 OKLA. STAr. § 2258.2 (Supp. 1983).
100. 75 OKLA. STA7I. § 314(A) (1981).

101. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 681.
102. Brief in Chief of Appellant at 10, DuLaney (Nos. 70498,70524) (quoting Michael P. Cox, The
Oklahoma Administrative ProceduresAct: Fifteen Years of Interpretation, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 886, 899
(1978)).
103. 75 OKLA. STAr. § 314(A) (1981).
104. 75 OKLA. STAT. § 250.3(3) (Supp. 1989).
105. Stewart v. Root], 796 P.2d 321, 327 (Okla. 1990).

106. Id. at 328 (citing Maurice H. Merrill, Oklahoma'sNew AdministrativeProcedureAct, 17 OKLA.
L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1964))
107. Id.
108. 63 OKLA. STAr. § 2258.2 (1981).
109. Stewart, 796 P.2d at 330-31.
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interested parties the right to an individual "hearing," then the language of the statute
would expressly delineate this desire."0 In fact, the Oklahoma legislature had given
this effect to other statutes."' Instead, the court determined that the legislature meant
to comply with the Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act,"' which sets forth
requirements for public participation."' Therefore, no statutory basis afforded the
adjacent landowners the opportunity to a permit hearing."4
In Mathews v. Eldridge,"5 the United States Supreme Court identified three
specific factors in determining the sufficiency of the afforded due process: (1) the
affected private interest, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation as a result of the
procedures used and the probable value of suggested additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's interest, including administrative
burdens, that the additional or alternative procedures would entail."6 Once the
claimant establishes an affected private interest, the preferable line of analysis would
be to apply the established Mathews factors.
Under the Mathews analysis, the DuLaney court should have evaluated the
claimants' access to substitute or additional procedural safeguards. In fact, this is the
essence of the Sharp holding, overruled by DuLaney. In Sharp, a group of area
residents and landowners challenged the issuance of an OSWMA permit for a solid
waste landfill." 7 After the trial court denied the group judicial review of the permit
procedure under the Oklahoma Administrative Procedure Act, they sought and
received injunctive relief."8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the OSWMA
does not preempt a common law nuisance action."9
Though disregarded by the DuLaney court, the Sharp holding is significant to the
analysis of the DuLaney decision. Resolving the central issue in DuLaney, in fact,
depends upon the Sharp holding. The presence of state common law remedies can
serve as adequate procedural protection even when there is a deprivation of a protected
interest." If the state provides a means of redress for such a deprivation, a
predeprivation hearing is not always mandated.'' The force and significance of this
analysis cannot be disarmed by summarily dismissing Sharp.
Under the Mathews approach, the DuLaney court also should have evaluated the
government's interest and the administrative agency's burden of an individual trial-type
proceeding instead of a formal public meeting. The state's interest in regulating
sanitary landfills, maintaining public health and safety, and environmental quality is

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.

Id.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1995).
Stewart, 796 P.2d at 332.
Id.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, 810 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Okla. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 1275.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977).
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1981).
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substantial. The increased burden of providing fully developed, individual, trial-type
hearings instead of public meetings is also significant. This is especially true since the
DuLaney court grants any citizen who may be affected this right.
To support its broad coverage, the DuLaney court relied upon the Alabama Supreme
Court's ruling in Brown's Ferry.'" Facially, Brown's Ferry would seem to demand
that the adjacent landowners in DuLaney be provided with notice and the opportunity
to be heard. Browns Ferry, however, is clearly distinguishable from DuLaney. By
recognizing a protected property right of adjacent landowners for the purposes of due
process protection, the Alabama *Supreme Court merely found notice and the
opportunity to be heard as the process due." The Brown's Ferry holding does not
delineate the necessity of a trial-type proceeding.
The requirement of an individual, trial-type proceeding, however, is the other major
issue presented by DuLaney. If Brown's Ferry represents adequate process to
safeguard the property interests of adjacent landowners, then the issuance of the
challenged permit in DuLaney did not violate the Due Process Clause. The public
meeting afforded in DuLaney provided the "opportunity to be heard" required by
Brown's Ferry. Clearly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has provided authority which
undercuts its own analysis.
3. Retroactive Effect
The DuLaney court's analysis includes a final and significant flaw in the last
paragraph of its decisiDn. In this paragraph the majority decreed: "Our decision today
is given the effect in the immediate cause, all appellant and certiorari cases in the
appellate pipeline, and prospectively to all future cases after the issuance of the
mandate."'" The DuLaney court did not announce that prior permits issued under
a former version of the OSWMA without a trial-type proceeding are void. By
allowing the holding to apply to all future cases, however, the majority clearly
indicated that they are voidable. Thus, the majority improperly placed no limitation
on the retroactive application of DuLaney.
The majority completely disregarded the letter and intent of the OSWMA. The
statutory parameters of the amended OSWMA provide: "The provisions of this section
shall not affect any pending applications and any pending litigation related to the
procedures by which the Department has issued permits before September 1,
1990."' The role of the judiciary is to give effect to legislative acts, not to
circumvent them by substituting its own concept of prudent policy for that of the
legislature."2 "Neither the Supreme Court nor a district court may expand the plain
wording of a statute by construction where the legislature has expressed its intention

122. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 682-83 (citing Brown's Ferry Waste Disposal Ctr. v. Trent, 611 So. 2d
226, 228 (Ala. 1992)).
123. Brown's Ferry,611 So. 2d at 230.
124. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 685.
125. Currently, 27A OKLA. STAT. § 2-20-303 (Supp. 1994).
126. Toxic Waste Impact Group v. Leavitt, 755 P.2d 626, 630 (Okla. 1988) (citing United States
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979); Allgood v. Allgood, 262 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Okla. 1981)).
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in the statute as enacted."" The court exceeded its interpretive duty" by disregarding the Oklahoma legislature.
In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ignored the standard for determining
retroactive application established by judicial precedent. Because there is no
constitutional decree to determine the effective date of a judicial decision," judicial
policy determines whether, and to what extent, a holding will have retroactive
operation.'" Two distinct standards have guided the courts in determining the extent
to which a decision should be applied retroactively. The Linkletter v. Walker"' test
considers three factors: (1) the new rule's purpose, (2) the extent of reliance on the old
doctrine, and (3) the likely burden on the administration of the legal process as a result
of the increased volume of curative judicial action."
The other established standard, from Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, also uses a
tripartite test to determine retroactivity. 33 The Chevron test considers whether: (1)
the decision must overrule clear past precedent on which the litigants may have relied
or be an issue of first impression not clearly foreshadowed, (2) retroactive application
will progress or hinder the operation of new law, and (3) hardship and injustice can
be avoided by nonretroactive application "
In the past, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has evaluated both tests. 3 In DuLaney,
the court apparently found the application of these tests to be irrelevant. The
application of either test, however, might have produced a different result.
Under the Linkletter test, there is strong opposition to retroactive application in
DuLaney. The Oklahoma legislature passed the OSWMA in 1970 to regulate solid
waste to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public and to beautify and
enhance the quality of the environment.'" Under the authority of the legislature, the
respective permitting agency has relied on the legality of its procedures for years in
the issuance of countless permits. The DuLaney result could be a complete
invalidation of them. The operating landfills, necessary to the health and safety of the
public, would be placed in jeopardy by complete retroactive application. In addition,
the burden on courts, agencies, and facility operators would far exceed the denial of

127. Leavitt, 755 P.2d at 630 (Okla. 1988) (citing Sisney v. Smalley 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okla.

1984)).
128. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972). While the Roth Court referred
specifically to the duty of the United States Supreme Court, certainly the clear notion exists that a
reviewing court's adjudicative responsibility centers on interpreting law. Reconsidering a legislative
policy decision, then, is outside the powers of any judiciary.
129. Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 438, 445 (Okla. 1986) (citing
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-29
(1965); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932)).
130. Carlile, 732 P.2d at 445 (citing Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., 652 P.2d 260, 268 (Okla.
1982); Griggs v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Transp., 702 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Okla. 1985)).
131. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
132. Carlile, 732 P.2d at 445.
133. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
134. Id.
135. Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., 652 P.2d 260, 268-69 (Okla. 1982).
136. Stewart v. Rood, 796 P.2d 321, 329 (Okla. 1990).
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prospective rights of adjacent landowners because of a permitting procedural defect.
If the permitted operations of a landfill had truly denied adjacent landowners sufficient
property rights, then why have nuisance actions not already been pursued?
The Chevron test provides even more formidable opposition to complete
retroactivity. Undeniably, the DuLaney decision overruled Stewart37 and Sharp.''
As expressed by the court while denying complete retroactive application in another
case, the "new norms pronounced by us here represent a clear break with contrary
statutory policy of long standing."'39 In addition, neither Stewart nor Sharp
foreshadowed the new rule. Due to the hardship that can be avoided by nonretroactive
application, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should have limited the retroactivity of its
holding.
The court does correctly apply the direct review factor of retroactivity. The court
recognizes that: "The action here is a direct, not a collateral attack."'" Certainly, the
determination whether a suit represents a direct review versus a collateral attack also
factors into the retroactive determination. 4' While collateral attacks impose
significant hardship on the administration of the legal process,"" direct reviews are
perceived quite diffe-rently.' The application of retroactivity "is confined to those
civil disputes over the constitutionality of a state statute in which the challenge is
made by direct rather than collateral attack.'"
Nonetheless, all permits previously issued by administrative agencies without
affording notice and individual, trial-type proceedings to all parties entitled thereto are
still voidable. Those that would represent a collateral attack are overruled, while the
remainder are voidable by direct review.
D. Dissent"s
The DuLaney dissent clarified the errors inherent in the majority's flawed analysis.
Initially, the dissent expressed the restraints to the Due Process Clause availability,
which were completely ignored by the majority. The existence of alternative remedies,
the lack of direct injury to the adjacent landowners, and the strength of the state's
interest in exercising police power all curtail the due process violation claim by the
adjacent landowners in DuLaney.

137. 796 P.2d 321 (Okla. 1990).
138. 810 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1991).
139. Carlile, 732 P.2d at 445 (Okla. 1986).
140. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 685.
141. Carlile, 732 P.2d at 446-48.
142. Id. at 448.
143. Id. (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
144. Id. at 448 nA6 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1981)).
145. To truly underrtand the shift from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in regard to adjacent
landowners' right to dt e process in Stewart and Sharp to that in DuLaney, the most effective
investigation might be tc look at the personnel of the court. The majority in Stewart and Sharp is now
dissent in DuLaney, while the majority in DuLaney was the dissent in Stewart and Sharp. Gone from
the court is Justice Doolin. Added is the Oklahoma Supreme Court's newest member, Justice Watt. Will
another change in personnel precipitate another change in the law?
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Proper Due Process Clause analysis involves the consideration of alternative
remedies available to the claimant."4 When alternative remedies do exist, it
necessarily follows that the claimant's rights are not denied because the injured party
has access to remediation. Although the adjacent landowner in DuLaney did not
participate in the desired trial-type hearing, the dissent correctly argued that this party
could pursue a damages claim against the landfill operators if the operation of the
landfill proved to be injurious. 47 In addition, the claimant could have sought an
injunction or claimed anticipatory nuisance if the evidence indicated that the landfill
would harm the groundwater beneath the adjacent landowner's property."4 There is
no indication that the majority considered the availability of alternative remedies.
The central fallacy in the majority's reasoning as to adjacent
landowners is that it fails to recognize the licensing process, directed as
it is to anotherperson's land, does not implicate in any direct, substantial
and immediate way any property interests of adjacent landowners subject
to constitutional due process protection at the administrative level. 49
In the above quotation, the dissent revealed yet another aspect of the due process
analysis disregarded by the majority. The administrative agency's permit issuance was
directed at the applicant, not the adjacent landowners. Since claimed constitutional
property deprivation would be an indirect effect of the permit issuance, it cannot
implicate the Due Process Clause." The dissent offered both United States Supreme
Court and Oklahoma Supreme Court authority for this assertion."'
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the Due Process Clause only refers
to direct interference with protected rights, not consequential injuries resulting from
the valid exercise of state power." z The United States Supreme Court held that due
process protection does not cover the indirect injuries of a claimant when the
challenged government action was directed at a third party. 3
In State ex rel. Oklahoma CorporationCommission v. Texas County, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court also held that an administrative agency's issuance of a permit to an
applicant does not implicate the due process rights of third parties seeking protection."u Instead, the Texas County court found that the agency's action constituted the
proper exertion of police power."5 It correctly pointed out that all privately owned
property remains subject to the state's valid police power."s

146. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
147. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 686 (Lavender, V.C.J., dissenting).
148. Id. (citing Stewart, 796 P.2d at 324 n.2; Sharp, 810 P.2d at 1275-76).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980); State ex rel.
Corporation Comm'n v. Texas County Irrigation & Water Resources Ass'n, 818 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1991)).
152. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 686 (Lavender, V.C.J., dissenting) (citing O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 789).
153. Id. (citing O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 788).
154. Texas County, 818 P.2d at 452.
155. Id. at 453.
156. Id.
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The claimed property deprivation in Texas County, as in DuLaney, was protected
water rights." Contrary to DuLaney, however, the Texas County court expressed:
'The infliction of suzh loss is not a deprivation of property without due process of
law; the exertion of the police power upon subjects lying within its scope, in a proper
and lawful manner, is due process of law.""' Again, the majority failed to balance
the rights of the individual property owner against the rights of the state in exercising
valid police power.
Clearly, the licensing agency of solid waste landfills exercises valid police power.
The OSWMA serves to protect the public's health, safety, and welfare and protect the
quality of the environment. 59 The permitting process under the OSWMA, then,
inherently considers the degree to which the operation of the landfill will affect health
and safety. The rights of the landfill applicant are not the only issues confronting the
licensing body. Unfortunately, the operation of the landfill may prove to infringe upon
rights of individuals after the permit has been issued. Under its police power authority,
however, the administrative agency has not denied the potentially injured party due
process. As argued by the dissent, the proper remediation would be to challenge the
landfill operator, not the permitting agency."
In addition, the dissent recognized the burdensome ramifications of holding that due
process rights of private parties may be implicated when a governmental agency issues
a permit to a third party. "Such a holding opens up a myriad of licensing proceedings
similar to due process challenges, e.g. licenses for a laundry, a tavern, a liquor store,
a slaughterhouse, a gas station or a convenient store."'61 Even the issuance of a
driver's license without giving potentially affected citizens the right to notice and a
trial-type proceeding may violate the Due Process Clause under the majority's holding.
Certainly, the judiciary must act within the confines of its adjudicative power, as
suggested by the dissent. " The separation of powers must exist to serve as adequate
checks and balances between the governmental branches while contemporarily
allowing the uninfringed performance of delegated governmental responsibilities. The
DuLaney majority, however, has not only contradicted recent Oklahoma Supreme
Court authority," but also has assumed legislative capacity." "[T]he majority has
improperly stepped into the role of a super-legislature in this particular case by
mandating constitutional due process protections where no constitutionally protected
interests exists."'"

157. Id. at 450.
158. Id. at 453 (citing Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 241 P.2d 363, 372
(Okla. 1951) (quoting Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1934))).
159. 27A OKLA. STAT. § 2-10-102 (Supp. 1994).
160. DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 686 (Lavender, V.C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 687.

162. Id.at 687-88.
163. Id. at 688 (citing Turley v. Flag-Redfem Oil Co., 782 P.2d 130 (Okla.1989)). The Turley court
ruled that adjacent landowners have no due process rights at the administrative level. In addition, if an
alternative statutory remedy adequately protects a constitutional interest, then no due process violation
occurs at the administrative level. Id. at 135-36.
164. DuLaney, 868 l'.2d at 689 (Lavender, V.C.J., dissenting).
165. Id.
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IV. Ramifications of DuLaney
A. Validity of PriorLandfill Permits
The potential for complete retroactive application of the DuLaney decision questions
the validity of all landfill permits similarly issued without provision of notice to all
potentially affected citizenry and an individual, trial-type proceeding. The only
limitation for such claims would be applicable statutes of limitation. While the
Oklahoma Statutes provide no express limitation for actions based on a denial of
constitutional rights, a catch-all provision exists for actions not based on real property
claims. " Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action
accrues, based upon the time when a plaintiff could first maintain an action to a
successful result." Arguably, since this same cause of action had been previously
alleged unsuccessfully in front of the Oklahoma Supreme Court,"6 an adjacent
landowner could not maintain this cause of action with a successful result prior to
DuLaney.
The statute of limitations, then, would not begin to run until the DuLaney decision.
Consequently, the applicable statute of limitations has only recently began running on
all previously issued landfill permits under the former version of the OSWMA, which
did not grant a right for all potentially affected citizenry to have notice and the
opportunity to participate in a trial-type hearing. The completely retroactive holding,
therefore, places in doubt the validity of all OSWMA permits issued prior to the
DuLaney decision.
B. Validity of Other Environmental Permits
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in DuLaney, in fact, challenges the validity
of all environmental permits. The court expressed the broad applicability of its holding
by legitimizing the various concerns of the adjacent landowners and any other
citizenry who may be affected. Further, the DuLaney court recognized that any adverse
environmental effects could implicate Due Process Clause protection.
Certainly, solid waste landfills are not the only facilities necessitating the issuance
of permits by the DEQ. The Oklahoma Environmental Quality Code lists permitting
procedures for the Oklahoma Clean Air Act," the Oklahoma Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Act,17 and the Oklahoma Hazardous Waste Management
Act."' The DuLaney decision requires each of these statutes to provide notice and
individual, "trial-type" hearings prior to the issuance of an environmental permit. In

166. While 12 OKLA. STAT. § 93 (1991) provides limitations for actions based on real property
claims, 12 OKLA. STAT. § 95 (Supp. 1994) provides limitations for all other actions.
167. See Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman, 632 P.2d 368 (Okla. 1980); Beatty v.
Miley 233 P.2d 269 (Okla. 1951); Moore v. Delivery Servs., Inc., 618 P.2d 408 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
168. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, 810 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1991); Stewart v. Rood, 796 P.2d 321 (Okla.
1990).
169. 27A OKLA. STAT. § 2-5-112 (Supp. 1994).
170. Id. § 2-6-205.1.
171. Id. §§ 2-7-113, 2-7-116, 2-7-123.
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response to DuLaney and the inconsistencies between the various environmental
permitting statutes, the Oklahoma legislature has recently amended the statutes to
create uniformity in these procedures."
V. Conclusion
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's vague, expansive, and retroactive decision in
DuLaney has created widespread uncertainty in Oklahoma environmental law. In
particular, the court broadly authorized a fully developed, "trial-type" proceeding to
all citizenry who may be affected. This broad class of persons is without any clearly
specified limitation. "I'he court, in effect, has rendered meaningless the standing
doctrine. In addition, the DuLaney court applied this unlimited standing to not only
all previously issued landfill permits but also all environmentalpermits. Through this
broad application, unless overruled, limited, or clarified, the DuLaney decision clouds
the validity of all Oklahoma environmental permits.
Brent M. Johnson

172. Senate Bill No. 997, the Oklahoma Uniform Environmental Permitting Act, was approved June
1994. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws 1870 (ch. 373). Section 2 defines the intent as to provide uniform
permitting provisions regarding notice and public participation opportunities for permits issued by the
DEQ. Id. § 2, 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws at 1871. Section 15(B)(I) provides the opportunity to request an
administrative hearing on zn application for certain permits. Id. § 15(B)(1), 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws at
1882. Section 15(B)(4) provides that the hearing shall be a quasi-judicial proceeding in accordance with
the Administrative Procedures Act. Id.
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